Abstract. In this article we introduce the concept for a distributed railway control system and present the speci cation and veri cation of the main algorithm used for safe distributed control. Our design and verication approach is based on the RAISE method, starting with highly abstract algebraic speci cations which are transformed into directly implementable distributed control processes by applying a series of re nement and veri cation steps. Concrete safety requirements are derived from an abstract version that can be easily validated with respect to soundness and completeness. Complexity is further reduced by separating the system model into a domain model describing the physical system in absence of control and a controller model introducing the safety-related control mechanisms as a separate entity monitoring observables of the physical system to decide whether it is safe for a train to move or for a point to be switched.
Introduction
The present modernisation of European railway networks raises a large variety of issues related to the design and veri cation of railway control systems. One of these problems is the question how to design control systems for small local networks that can only operate e ectively if the costs for initial installation, operation and maintenance of the control system are low. Today's centralised interlocking systems { at least those which are available in Germany { are far too expensive for such small (possibly privatised) networks. A promising approach is to distribute the tasks of train control, train protection and interlocking over a network of cooperating components using the standard communication facilities o ered by mobile telephone providers. On the other hand, a distributed control concept also introduces new safety issues that could be disregarded as long as centralised control was applied: First, the new communication medium requires security and reliability mechanisms that were unnecessary for centralised systems transmitting control commands to signals and points over wires. Second, the distribution of a control algorithm over several components raises new design and veri cation issues, since the concept of a global state space as available in a centralised interlocking system can no longer be implemented.
In this article, we will describe the concept of a distributed railway control system consisting of switch boxes (SB), each one locally controlling a point, and train control computers (TCC) residing in the train engines and collecting the local state information from switch boxes along the track to derive the decision whether the train may enter the next track segment. The system concept does not require signals along the track, since the \go/no-go" decisions are performed and indicated in the train control computers. We give an overview over the formal speci cation and veri cation of the main control algorithm executed by the distributed cooperating control components. The system is designed to operate on simple networks, which means in our context that there are two distinguished destinations A and B, such that at each track segment of the network there is a uniquely de ned direction to reach A and B, respectively. Typically, this de nition applies to networks which are not highly frequented by trains and connect two main stations with small intermediate stations (Figure 1 Our speci cation and veri cation approach is based on the RAISE formal method and tool set Rlg92, Rmg95] and follows the invent-and-verify paradigm. To address safety issues in a systematic way the standard procedure (see Sto96]) separating the equipment under control { that is, the railway network with its trains { from the control system { in our case, the set of TCCs and SBs { is applied. To this end, we rst develop abstract algebraic speci cations for the domain model, i. e., the railway network and the trains to be controlled, and the safety requirements stating that the system must not perform a transition into a hazardous state where trains may collide or derailing might occur. These requirements are expressed as conditions about the observables of the domain model. Using stepwise re nement and accompanying veri cation steps, we introduce additional observables that may be monitored by a controller giving the \can move/cannot move" conditions for each train and the \can be switched/cannot be switched" conditions for each point. The completeness and consistency of these conditions is veri ed by proving re nement relations to the higher-level speci cations which already have been proved to be consistent with the initial safety requirements. The rst stage of the invent-and-verify development ends when the observables of the last re nement needed to control the safety of train movements and point switching are implementable in the sense that they can be transformed into a concrete state space that may be conveniently partitioned among a set of distributed cooperating processes. The second stage speci es and veri es the concrete { i.e., implementable { distributed controller model by introducing communicating processes which represent train control computers and switch boxes. The TCC processes collect state information from the SB processes to make the\can move/cannot move" decisions. The SB processes store the relevant state information to take the \can be switched/cannot be switched" decisions for their local points. The resulting controller is a nondeterministic distributed program. The nondeterministic process constructs indicate where application-dependent control decisions { like de ning the order in which trains may pass along a single-track section { can be made without violating the safety requirements.
The work presented here originated from a collaboration of the authors with INSY GmbH Berlin, who developed the distributed systems design described in the next section for their railway control system RELIS 2000 designed for local railway networks. In this collaboration, the authors focus on the generalisation and veri cation of the control concepts used in RELIS 2000. Furthermore, the second author is cooperating with South African Railways in the eld of development, veri cation, validation and test of safety-critical systems.
In Section 2, we introduce the general concept for the distributed railway control system discussed in this article. Section 3 presents the formal speci cation of the system's domain model. In Section 4, an abstract version of the safety requirements is introduced. The subsequent sections are concerned with the development of the control system as a series of re nement and veri cation steps. In the discussion (Section 7) we sketch the more general issues of our concept for the development, veri cation, validation and test of safety-critical systems.
Engineering Concept
In this section, we introduce the technical concept of the distributed railway control system to be formally speci ed and veri ed below. The technical concept is based on the RELIS 2000 system of INSY GmbH with generalisations and modi cations performed by the authors.
Consider the system con guration depicted in Figure 2 . The tasks of train control, train protection and interlocking are distributed on train control computers (TCC) residing in each train T1, T2 and switch boxes (SB) SB1, SB2, SB3, each one controlling a single point, the boundary between two segments (e. g. blocks) of a single track or a railway crossing. The basic principle of the control algorithm is as follows:
{ Each switch box stores the local safety-related information in its state space.
For example, this information contains the actual state of the tra c lights guarding the railway crossing, whether a train is approaching the switch box or the track segments that are presently connected by the local point. The switch boxes use sensors to detect approaching trains and to decide whether a train has left the critical area close to a point or a crossing. { To pass a railway crossing or to enter a new track segment, a train's TCC communicates with the relevant switch boxes to make a request for blocking a crossing, switching a point or just reserving the relevant track segments at the SB for the train to pass. The decision which switch boxes to address is based on the location of the train which is determined by means of the Global Positioning System (GPS) or by using track components signalling their location to the passing train.
{ Depending on their local state, the switch boxes may or may not comply with the request received from a TCC. In any case, each SB returns its (possibly updated) local state information to the requesting TCC. After having collected the response from each relevant SB, the TCC evaluates the SB states to decide whether it is safe to approach the crossing or to enter the next track segment.
{ For train protection, each TCC blocks the train engine if it is not allowed to leave a station and triggers the emergency brake if the train approaches a railway crossing or enters a new track segment without permission from the associated switch boxes. Furthermore, each TCC monitors the speed of the train and gives warning messages or triggers the emergency brakes if the actual speed exceeds the maximum velocity admitted for the type of train at its actual location in the network.
In the subsequent sections we will focus on the formal speci cation and verication of the control algorithm concerned with \can move/cannot move" decisions for trains and \can be switched/cannot be switched" decisions for points. To introduce the principles of this algorithm, consider Figure 3 which shows the local state space of two switch boxes SB1, SB2.
In state component CONNECTED, the switch box stores which track segments are presently connected by the local point. (If the SB just separates two blocks on a single track, this information is static.) In the components DIR S1, DIR S2,.. . the directions associated with each track segment are stored: A segment can either be used only for trains going in direction A ! B, or for trains going in direction B ! A or in both directions (A $ B). Typically, this information is fairly static and will only be changed if deviations from the ordinary train schedule occur, for example when constructions are going on or when a train arrives late. As explained below, the segment direction will be evaluated to decide whether a train may reserve a switch box. It is also stored in the TCCs to determine which switch boxes to address in a speci c situation. The LOCKED BY state component indicates whether a speci c train has the right to pass the switch box. If such a train is registered in this component, it is impossible to switch the local point to another direction until the train has passed. For the detection of passing trains, a state component SENSOR is activated by a set of sensors attached to the track when a train approaches the point. The component is returned to state \passive" as soon as the sensors indicate that the last waggon of the train has passed the point. To decide whether a train may get a reservation for a segment approaching the switch box and whether a point may be locked for a train, additional state components RES S1, RES S2,. . . are maintained at each switch box for every track segment whose segment direction is approaching the SB. The ACTION component of the state space is used as a \transaction ag" for commands which have to be executed on several switch boxes in a synchronised manner: The switch box will refuse new commands, as long as the ACTION ag indicates such a transaction. Observe that this ag is unnecessary for the standard reservation commands described next. To determine, whether a train T1 may enter a new segment S2 (c. f. Figure 3) , the train control computer and the relevant switch boxes evaluate the state space 2. Each train must have a reservation for its local track segment at the next switch box to be approached by the train (S1 must be reserved for train T1 at switch box SB1).
{ To enter the next segment (S2 for train T1), three safety conditions must be ful lled: 1. The train direction must be consistent with the direction of the segment to be entered. (S1 has direction A $ B, so this is consistent with T1's train direction A ! B.)
2. The next SB must be locked for the train (SB1 is locked by T1, so this condition is ful lled for T1). 3. The train must have a reservation for the next segment S2 at every switch box where S2 is an approaching segment. (In Figure 3 , S2 approaches both SB1 and SB2, so T1 must reserve S2 at both switch boxes. In contrast to that, T2 only needed to reserve S3 at SB1 before entering S3 from S4.)
{ In order to ful l these two conditions, the train signals its wish to enter the next segment to the associated switch boxes. Each switch box enters the train's reservation for the next segment if this is not already reserved for another train. If reservation is possible and the SB is not locked by another train, it will switch its point into the required direction if necessary and lock the point for the requesting train.
{ If the two conditions are ful lled the train may enter the next segment. The next SB will delete the lock and all reservations made by the train, as soon as it has passed the SB. (In Figure 3 , SB1 will unlock its point and delete all references to T1, as soon as the train has passed the point and entered S2. Note that T1 is still completely safe at its new location, since each train wishing to enter S2 from either S1 or S4 also needs a reservation of S2 at SB2, and this is still blocked by T1.) In the sections below, this informal system concept is described and veri ed in a formal way.
Domain model
In this section we show (parts of) a domain model capturing those physical objects and events of the uncontrolled railway system which are relevant for the development of the railway control system. We divide the model into a static part and a dynamic (state based) part. Other authors have established similar railway domain models BGH + 97].
Static part of the model
The static part of the model comprise de nitions of data types for objects.
The physical objects we consider include the trains, the points (switch boxes) and the railway network. 5 Development of the railway control system: rst stage
Trains
The purpose of the railway control system is to prevent events to happen when they may lead to an unsafe state. We develop an implementable controller model by stepwise re nement following the invent-and-verify paradigm. The development is divided into two major stages of which we describe the rst in this section.
In the rst major stage of development we design a full state space keeping information not only about the dynamic properties described in the domain model, but also about new dynamic data (observables) like segment reservations which may be monitored by the controller to evaluate the \can move/cannot move" and \can be switched/cannot be switched" conditions. New data like segment reservations also give rise to new state constructors modelling events like making a reservation.
Our strategy for ful lling the safety requirements is to invent 1. a state invariant consistent( ), and 2. for each constructor con, a guard (condition) can con( , ...) which can be used by the controller to decide whether it should allow events (corresponding to application of that constructor) to happen such that the following strong safety requirements are ful lled:
1. States satisfying the state invariant must also be safe. 2. Any state transition made by a state constructor must preserve the state invariant when the associated guard is true. 3. If the guards for two di erent events are both true in a state satisfying the state invariant, then a state change made by one of the events must not make the guard for the other event false.
These requirements ensure that if the initial state satis es the state invariant, and the railway control system only allows events to happen when the corresponding guards are true then the system will stay safe. The rst strong safety requirement can be formalised by the following theory: consistent is safe ] 8 : State consistent( ) ) safe( )
The second strong safety requirement can be formalised by a theory safe con ] 8 ::: consistent( )^can con( , ::: ) ) consistent(con( , :::))
for each constructor con, and the third strong safety requirement can be formalised by a theory safe con1 con2 ] 8 :::
) can con2(con1( , x), y)
for each pair of constructors, con1 and con2. The state space, state invariant, guards etc. are found by stepwise re nement and veri cation.
First speci cation
The rst speci cation is an abstract, algebraic speci cation extending the domain model with the following declarations: We use implications so that we can enrich the requirements in later steps with additional constraints (by changing the right-hand sides of the implications). 
Second to fourth speci cation

Second speci cation
In the second speci cation, two new concepts are introduced:
{ segment registrations for trains, and { segment directions
The idea is, that a train must only be allowed to move to a segment if it is registered on that segment and if its direction is consistent with the direction of that segment.
Third speci cation
In the third speci cation, segment reservations at switch boxes is introduced and segment registrations is de ned in terms of that. Furthermore, a concept of locking of points is introduced. The idea is that a train must lock a point in order to pass it, and when a train has locked a point, the point cannot be switched before the train has passed the point.
Fourth speci cation
In the forth speci cation, a notion of train routes is introduced, and sensors at the switch boxes sense when trains are passing.
Fifth speci cation
Finally, in the fth speci cation we are able to de ne a concrete state space consisting of a state space for each train and a state space for each switch box: 
Veri cation Implementation relations
In each of the development steps (from speci cation number i to speci cation number i + 1, i = 1; :::; 4) above, we have used the RAISE justi cation tools to prove that the new speci cation is a re nement of the previous speci cation, i.e. the new speci cation provides declarations of at least all the types and functions provided by the previous speci cation, and that all the axioms of the previous speci cation are consequences of the axioms of the new speci cation.
Satisfaction of safety requirements
For each of the rst four speci cations we prove that it is consistent with the strong safety requirements stated in the beginning of this section, and nally for the fth speci cation we prove that it fully satis es these requirements.
The consistent is safe] theory is veri ed to hold already for the rst specication. Then, since re nements preserve theories, we know that it also holds for the second to fth speci cation.
Veri cation of the can con] theories is done stepwise: For speci cation number i we prove 8 ::: consistent( )^can con( , ::: ) ) pi(con( , :::)) Then, since re nements preserve theories, the fth speci cation satis es 8 ::: consistent( )^can con( , ::: ) ) (p1(con( , :::))^:::^p5(con( , :::))) which is equivalent to the can con] theory, cf. the de nition of consistent in the fth speci cation. Veri cation of the can con1 con2] theories is done similarly. (s) ) is a process representing switch box s. These processes are de ned in terms of the guards, state constructors and observers de ned in the rst major stage, and follow the protocol described in section 2.
Discussion
In this article, we have presented the engineering concept and the design and veri cation of a control algorithm for a distributed railway control system. We consider the following aspects of our work to be the main advantages in comparison to other work that has been performed in the eld of design and veri cation of similar systems:
{ Our re nement approach starting with highly abstract algebraic specications and ending with concrete distributed programs helps to separate general aspects of train control mechanisms and their safety from concrete application-speci c design decisions.
{ Our veri cation concept is independent on the size of the underlying network topology. In contrast to that, experiments with model checking have led to unmanageable explosions of the state space, as soon as more complex networks were involved or a larger number of trains had to be controlled.
{ Within the restrictions of the simple network de nition given above, the network topologies covered by our algorithm are fairly general: There are no limits regarding the size of the network, the number tracks involved or the places where points may occur. In contrast to that, approaches using compositional reasoning and structural induction over the underlying network topologies only seem to work for unrealistically simpli ed networks.
{ Starting with a most abstract version of safety requirements, our approach allows to verify their completeness and trace their \implementation" in the more concrete re nements of the abstract control algorithm in a straightforward manner. For approaches de ning only implementation-speci c safety requirements without reference to a more abstract safety concept, it is nearly infeasible to check safety requirements with respect to completeness.
We would like to emphasise that the control algorithm presented here represents just a building block in a more general approach for the development, veri cation, validation and test (VVT) of safety-critical systems which is investigated by the authors' research groups at DTU and the Bremen Institute of Safe Systems (BISS). In this wider context, our research work covers { A systems engineering approach for safety-critical systems which is driven by hazard analysis, risk analysis and a design approach taking VVT issues into consideration right from the beginning of the development life cycle, { Software-architectures for safety controllers, { Automated real-time testing for embedded hardware/software components, { An integrated standardised concept for veri cation, validation and test of safety-critical embedded controllers, applying combinations of VVT methods, each one optimised for a speci c step in the system development life cycle.
